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This article investigates how the budget priorities of Arkansas state government depart-
ments vary with changes in economic conditions. The Arkansas Revenue Stabilization Act 
(ARSA) of 1945 established a formalized method of state budgeting by priorities. State funds 
are allocated, meaning the funds are legally made available, according to priority levels es-
tablished each year by the Governor and the General Assembly. Those allocated funds are 
later distributed, meaning released for spending, according to priority levels as funds become 
available. In this study, we ask the research question: Are departmental budget priorities 
driven by stability or are they responsive to economic condition? Incrementalism suggests 
that incremental annual changes in the budget are based on the previous year’s budget, they 
take place across-the-board, and that there lacks an in depth consideration of priorities. 
However, ARSA requires explicit prioritization within each department. Perceptions of eco-
nomic conditions are likely to play into this prioritization. We hypothesize that the higher 
priority items will follow a more incremental pattern of mostly being based on the previous 
year’s budget in favor of stability. We also hypothesize that the economy has a greater impact 
on the lower priority items in favor of economic responsiveness. Our findings suggest that 
incrementalism is a persistent influence across priority levels. However, there is rational 
consideration during an economic downturn that results in a decline in funding for lower 
priority budget items. 
 
Keywords: incrementalism, cutback budgeting, budget process, revenue stabilization, budget 
priorities 





Using Arkansas’ unique approach to budgeting by priorities, this study in-
vestigates how the budget priorities of state government departments vary with 
changes in economic conditions. The Arkansas Revenue Stabilization Act 
(ARSA) allocates state funds according to priority levels established each year 
by the Governor in the Governor’s budget recommendation, with additional 
changes and revisions resulting from the legislative consideration process of 
the General Assembly. The allocated amount is the amount that is legally 
made available for spending. ARSA dictates the order of distribution (release 
for spending) of those allocated funds (Jordan, 2006). 
 
Although as many as six priority levels have been allocated in any given 
fiscal year, administrators generally view the lower priority allocations as ac-
tivities and purchases that will take place only if the revenue is available. 
Quarterly updates of the revenue forecast are used to inform administrators of 
the likelihood of the distribution of funds to the lower levels. This strategy 
creates confidence in being able to maintain the department’s capability to 
implement programs and services that are deemed as high priority (Jordan, 
2006).  
 
The ARSA prioritization method of budgeting has the stated purpose of 
stabilizing the budget during declining economic conditions resulting in reve-
nue shortfalls. Jordan (2006) concludes that ARSA was effective at protecting 
top priority budget items that made up almost 90% of the budget by essentially 
creating a 10% cushion, which was greater than the size of most states’ rainy 
day funds. As a result of this process, Arkansas lawmakers did not see a need 
for a ‘rainy day’ fund also known as a stabilization fund which sets aside 
funds for distribution when revenue falls short of expectations.  
 
Arkansas administrators view the lower priority items as those activities 
and associated expenses that will take place only if the revenue is available. If 
revenue collections fall short of expectations, then the allocated items with the 
lower priorities are not funded. Therefore, throughout the fiscal year, adminis-
trators execute their budgets with low priority items on hold until there is a 
distribution of funds to pay for them. This prioritization method of allocation 
and distribution was created to mitigate the impact of declining economic 
conditions. A decline in the economy resulting in a revenue shortfall makes 
funding of low priority items less probable. In this study of the ARSA ap-
proach to priority budgeting, we ask the research question: Are departmental 
budget priorities driven by stability or are they responsive to economic condi-
tion? 
Since 1945, Arkansas’ unique method of stabilization has served effective-
ly its purpose of creating a cushion for declining economic conditions. How-
ever, in recent years the public financial environment in which ARSA operates 
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has changed. The first change is the execution of significant funding reforms 
in the mid-2000s resulting from the Lake View education finance equity litiga-
tion1. Lake View, a poor, rural school district, sued the state claiming that reli-
ance upon local property taxes as the primary funding of education was unfair 
to those in districts with low property value. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
ruled the state’s funding as unconstitutional and that the state was solely re-
sponsible for the education system. Ultimately, primary education was ruled as 
being a state constitutional obligation that requires “adequate” funding. The 
rulings required a change in budget priorities, making primary (K-12) educa-
tion the “highest priority,” effectively lowering the priority of other areas of 
the budget (Jordan, et al., 2014).  
 
Second, despite the effectiveness of ARSA, lawmakers established a rainy 
day fund in fiscal year 2007 as a political signal that the state was fiscally re-
sponsible. A rainy day fund essentially creates a second opportunity for an 
item to be funded even if revenue falls short. The Arkansas Rainy Day Fund 
was created during a time of surplus but due to the subsequent recession did 
not receive allocation for several budget cycles. In fiscal year 2012, the rainy 
day fund received allocation for the first time of only $10 Million out of a 
budget that is over $4 Billion. This amount is far less than the rule of thumb of 
5%, which has often been found to be inadequate for state budget stabilization 
(Joyce, 2001; Hou, 2004).  
 
Finally, Arkansas was one of a few of states with a biennial legislature 
which met every other year, in odd-number years. In 2008, there was a ballot 
initiative to change budgeting to an annual process in order to make revenue 
forecasting easier and more accurate. Voters unexpectedly approved the con-
stitutional amendment to have legislators meet for a budget session in even-
numbered years. This modification made the state one of the first to make the 
switch in the budget process from biennial to annual within the last two dec-
ades (Snell, 2011).  
 
Combined, these changes suggest a need to reexamine ARSA to determine 
whether they have impacted departmental resource allocation decisions. 
Therefore, we seek to determine if ARSA is still used to respond to economic 
conditions. Our study spans the period 1992 through 2014, which encom-
passes these environmental changes surrounding ARSA.  
 
2. ARSA ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION  
 
Table 1 shows the budget allocations and distributions under ARSA for 
1992 through 2014. Across the years, the number of priority levels receiving 
distributed funds fluctuated from four levels in the mid-1990s to only a portion 
                                                          
1. Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee. 351 Ark. 31; 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002). 
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of the first level in 2010. However, for most years, only the first two budget 
levels are distributed. The consistent distribution of funds to the first priority 
level is evidence of the efficacy of the process at protecting the top priority 
budget items.  
 
3. INCREMENTAL VS. RATIONAL APPROACHES TO BUDGETING 
 
Wildavsky’s (1964) introduction of the incrementalism theory of budget-
ing has held a firm and prominent place in public administration. It theorizes 
that the stickiness or stability of the status quo and limited comprehensive 
consideration create across-the-board budget adjustments in small increments 
from the base or previous budgeted amount. In theory, this decidedly non-
rational approach is employed to mitigate conflict and the costs of negotiation 
and, therefore, avoids strategic review and deliberation of the entire budget 
(Schick, 1983). Robinson, et al. (2007) and Ryu, et al. (2008) conclude that 
spending patterns can be largely explained by incrementalism. However, there 
have been challenges to the exclusive focus on incrementalism that suggest 
that there are more rational approaches to budgeting used in practice. In fact, 
Reddick (2003) tests the use of incrementalism, the garbage can theory, and 
rational approaches such as biennial budgeting, and he concludes that there is 
not a singular “catch all” theoretical explanation of state budgeting (p. 337). 
He finds a dominant presence of incrementalism in combination with rational 
methods. This challenges the focus on incrementalism theory and suggests that 
the budget in practice is more rational under certain conditions. We argue that 
responding to strong economic downturns and allocating resources within spe-
cific budgeting frameworks require explicit and rational consideration of pri-
orities used in cutback budgeting and various budget processes. 
 
4. CUTBACK BUDGETING 
 
Incrementalism as a budget theory was born during a time of resource in-
crease. As a flip side to incrementalism, decrementalism avoids in-depth pro-
grammatic reviews and makes across-the-board small reductions. Decisions 
are made on the margins, leaving most of the budget unexamined (Schick, 
1983). Levine (1978) argues that in the face of “zero growth and absolute de-
cline”, there is a need to re-examine the expansionist view of budgeting (p. 
317). During strong economic downturns, states are faced with a balanced-
budget requirement which brings about greater reductions via cutback budget-
ing instead of decrementalism. At a time of deep budget declines or cutbacks, 
tough choices are not mitigated. The idea of a department receiving its fair 
share of the budget adjustment cannot persist during cutback budgeting. As the 
size of the cuts increase or the period of decline is prolonged (i.e. a long or 
deep recession), the cuts become more targeted and, therefore, more rational 
(Behn, 1985).  
 




Levine (1978) defines cutback management as initiatives and interventions 
needed to lead a public organization toward a more efficient organization that 
consumes fewer resources. He argues that cutback management meant that 
public managers have to consider tactics that are “inclusionary” in spreading 
the share of budget cuts. A review of the annual Fiscal Survey of the States by 
the National Association of State Budget Officers during the Great Recession 
and its slow recovery period reveals that across-the-board cuts are a common 
state government strategy during the recession, but the prevalence of targeted 
cuts grew over the time period. This diffused strategy was confirmed by Klase 
Table 1. Budget Levels Allocated and Distributed Under ARSA  
structure, 1992-2014 
Year Funding Allocation Actual Distribution Priority Levels Distributed* 
1992 $2,175,189,495 $1,934,996,462 A+A1+55.28% of B 
1993 $2,431,887,384  $2,076,967,023  A+A1+27.7% of B 
1994 $2,270,946,228  $2,270,017,689  A+B+B1+C+90.27% of C1 
1995 $2,400,379,719  $2,452,523,636  A+B+B1+C+C1 
1996 $2,533,174,612  $2,631,960,737  A+B+B1+C+C1 
1997 $2,685,312,075  $2,771,893,531 A+B+B1+C+C1 
1998 $2,902,837,978  $2,969,804,598  A+B 
1999 $3,009,281,308  $3,103,708,459  A+B 
2000 $3,243,688,704  $3,176,581,515 A+79.91% of B 
2001 $3,437,168,936  $3,258,940,496  A+40.6% of B 
2002 $3,450,739,822  $3,238,373,556  98.72% of A  
2003 $3,623,980,274  $3,250,769,591  93.94% of A 
2004 $3,525,966,225  $3,598,842,591  A + B + B1 
2005 $3,629,925,804  $3,937,142,958  A + B + B1 
2006 $3,825,053,006  $4,227,770,000  A + B  
2007 $4,058,615,931  $4,467,900,000  A + B + C 
2008 $4,352,672,063  $4,529,200,000  A + A1+ B 
2009 $4,523,673,103  $4,434,701,497  A + A1 + 53.9% of B 
2010 $4,593,605,359  $4,323,207,922  94.73% of A 
2011 $4,478,900,000  $4,572,847,441  A + B 
2012 $4,605,925,000  $4,751,568,795  A + B 
2013 $4,727,500,000  $5,026,990,611  A + $137.7 million 
2014 $4,943,779,505  $5,022,445,083  A+B+C 
*The letters used to denote priority levels come from the legislation. The variation in what the priority 
levels are called is a matter of legislative preference. For instance, “A” is always the first priority level, 
but the second priority level may be named “A1” or “B” in the legislation. 
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(2011) in his comparison of state responses across two recessions in the 2000s. 
As recession severity grew, states moved past the across-the-board cuts to 
more targeted eliminations. During fiscal stress, cutback budgeting reflects 
administrative choices that represent shifts in departmental programmatic pri-
orities (Daugherty and Klase, 2009; Bartle, 1996). 
 
Conant (2010) provides a summary of how six states dealt with budget 
shortfalls during the Great Recession. He argues that in states with structural 
deficits, the main driver and cause of the deficit was Medicaid; therefore, 
Medicaid was a common target for budgetary cuts (Conant, 2010). In Con-
necticut, higher education was also targeted for cuts in spending, and other 
agencies were targeted for elimination and consolidation (Dautrich, et al., 
2010). Massachusetts also targeted health care and education in addition to 
state aid to local governments (Wallin and Snow, 2010). The targeted cuts 
resulted from prioritization across functions. For instance, explanations assert-
ed for targeting cuts to higher education and aid to local governments were 
that those entities could raise their own revenue, and, therefore, were lower 
priority for state funding. 
  
5. BUDGET PROCESSES 
 
Some budget processes are put in place with the intent of encouraging 
planning and deliberate consideration of alternatives. Three such processes are 
biennial budgeting, performance-based budgeting, and zero-base budgeting. 
While annual budgeting is advocated as an important part of the budget reform 
movement for increasing control, it decreases the time necessary for financial 
planning. Therefore, the biennial budget process, which allows for a longer 
planning period, is viewed as a more rational approach (Schick, 1983; Red-
dick, 2003; Hou, 2006). Until 2008, ARSA involved a biennial budget process 
which required establishing priorities for two fiscal years.  
  
Performance-based budgeting process has the purpose of implementing 
planning, strategizing, and prioritizing into the budget process. Management’s 
development of goals and objectives are integrated into the budget process and 
decision making (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999; Hou, et al, 2011). While Jordan 
and Hackbart find that performance-based budgeting is a useful managerial 
tool that may not impact budget decisions, Hou, et al. observe that some states 
use performance measurement for prioritizing budget decisions but perhaps 
less so during fiscal stress. 
 
Under zero-base budgeting, decision making is intended to be more ration-
al and comprehensive because the base or previous amount is scrutinized and 
decision makers are provided additional information for choosing between 
alternatives (Draper and Pitsvada, 1981). Even the modern day version of ze-
ro-base budgeting requires a review of performance in addition to the delibera-
Jordan, Yusuf & Hooshmand 
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tion of the base as opposed to assuming the base is a constant even if drilling 
into the base is largely symbolic (Lauth, 2014).  
 
Even as rational budget reforms, like performance-based and zero-base 
budgeting, undergo many variations, their common intent seems to be to insert 
prospective consideration of policy alternatives and priorities (Reddick, 2003). 
What cutback budgeting and rational budget reforms have in common with 
ARSA is that they move away from the across-the-board “fair share” assump-
tion of incrementalism. They introduce prioritization into budgetary decision 
making, which is the complexity that incrementalism theory is said to avoid.  
 
6. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theory of incrementalism (and decrementalism) states that changes in 
the budget will take place across-the-board in small increments from the pre-
vious year. The definition of “small increments” is not clearly defined in the 
literature. However, the significance of the previous year as the basis of budg-
et changes is consistent among incrementalist, which is the focus in this study. 
The theory suggests a lack of in depth budget consideration of priorities. On 
the other hand, ARSA requires explicit prioritization for each department, and 
the prioritized order of distribution is contingent upon revenue flow. As Clem-
ens and Miran (2012) note, state balanced budget requirements create a tight 
relationship between state governments' revenues and expenditures.  
  
Not surprisingly, the theoretical and empirical literature have shown that, 
because budgeting is open to the environment (i.e., the economy), budget 
strategies are more rational during specific economic periods, such as those 
requiring cutback budgeting, particularly when the economy is expected to 
change in the negative direction. Therefore, we hypothesize that the economy 
will have a significant impact on budget decisions. However, because decision 
makers are boundedly rational and likely to make decisions at the margin, we 
expect that some features of stability will remain as budget decisions are based 
on the previous year’s budget. Specifically, we hypothesize that the higher 
priority items will follow a more incremental pattern, while the economy has a 
greater impact on the lower priority items. The rational decision to place items 
in priority Level 1 has already been decided in previous periods based on ex-
pectations regarding service levels and costs. Therefore, budget decisions over 
time regarding priority Level 1 will not undergo additional scrutiny and will 
be incremental. On the other hand, lower priority items will be subject to addi-
tional scrutiny and re-prioritization. We hypothesize that budgeting for higher 
priority items tends to be more stable and incremental in nature due to the 
need to maintain or protect basic funding needs. Therefore, allocation deci-
sions for higher priority budget levels are expected to rely on the previous 
year’s allocation. Lower priority items are considered more discretionary and 
often subject to greater decision making scrutiny. Therefore, allocation deci-
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sions for lower priority budget levels are expected to be less subject to incre-
mental decision making, instead being more open and responsive to economic 
forces and the perceived likelihood of greater or less revenues. 
H1: Higher priority budget levels are related to the previous year’s budget 
allocations, in support of incrementalism.  
H2: Lower priority budget levels are related to perceptions of economic condi-
tions, in support of rational decision making. 
 
Previous research has found that state-level fiscal policy is asymmetric, 
with differing responses to “expansions and recessions of equal magnitudes” 
(Sorensen & Yosha, 2001, p. 47). A one percent expansion in gross state 
product (GSP), for example, may not generate the same magnitude response to 
a one percent contraction in GSP. To capture this asymmetry, we distinguish 
between positive and negative changes in economic condition. 
 
Given ARSA’s prioritization structure, we also expect there to be little dif-
ferences across departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allo-
cation ratios. We expect that the size of the department will not matter for the 
highest priority level. All departments and their advocates will seek to protect 
the status quo of their highest priority items, and the stability of Level 1 priori-
ty will not vary across departments based on their size relative to the total 
budget. However, we expect size of the department to matter at priority Level 
2. Keeping in mind that there may be and often are more than two priority 
levels, departments that are larger in size may have more budget items to cate-
gorize, which creates more opportunity to change the proportion of the items 
categorized at priority Level 2.  
 
7. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our study’s unit of analysis is department expenditures. The three depend-
ent variables are: 
(1) percent of the department’s budget that is allocated in priority Level 1; 
(2) percent of the department’s budget that is allocated in priority Level 2; 
(3) ratio of department’s budget in Level 2 to Level 1. 
 
Arkansas departmental budget data are obtained from the state budget of-
fice for each priority level. Consistent with prior research on the Arkansas 
priority budgeting approach (Jordan, 2006), we focus on 11 departments in the 
state of Arkansas government from fiscal years 1992 to 2014. These depart-
ments are listed in Table 2. This table summarizes the department budgets in 
terms of the percent of department budget in Levels 1 and 2 between 1992 and 
2014, and also shows the variability of department budget allocations across 
time. The proportion of the departmental budget in priority Level 1 is between 
92% and 98%, averaging 96.1%, which is higher for each department than in 
Jordan, Yusuf & Hooshmand 
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Jordan’s 2006 study of ARSA; however the state’s grand budget total only 
increased from about 90% to 92%. There is greater variation in departmental 
budgets in Level 2 compared to Level 1. The average coefficient of variation 
for Level 1 is 6.8% compared to 208.1% for Level 2. Differences in the coef-
ficient of variation between Levels 1 and 2 is statistically significant at 
p<.001. 
 
Table 3 shows the department’s allocation ratios (Level 2 to Level 1) and 
the size of the department’s budget as a percent of the state’s total budget. The 
ratio of the department’s budget in Level 2 to Level 1 (column two in Table 3) 
reflects an inverse measure of how much the department’s budget is priori-
tized at a higher level. A lower number for this ratio reflects greater reliance 
on Level 1, and conversely less reliance on Level 2. This indicates that a 
greater portion of the budget is categorized as high priority. There are several 
observations where the department budget is 100% in Level 1, so the ratio of 
Level 2 to Level 1 is 0.  
 
Table 2. Percent of Department Budget in Level 1 and Level 2, 1992-2014 
 Level 1 Level 2 
Department Mean Std Dev CV Mean Std Dev CV 
Aging & Adult Services 92.20% 11.80% 12.80% 5.00% 9.70% 194.00% 
Children & Family Services 94.00% 8.50% 9.00% 2.20% 4.80% 218.20% 
Corrections 93.80% 5.50% 5.90% 4.10% 4.30% 104.90% 
County Aid 96.50% 4.70% 4.90% 0.50% 2.00% 400.00% 
Economic Development 97.10% 3.20% 3.30% 1.30% 1.70% 130.80% 
Higher Education 95.00% 6.00% 6.30% 1.80% 2.30% 127.80% 
K-12 Education 96.40% 4.00% 4.10% 2.30% 1.90% 82.60% 
Labor 94.90% 8.40% 8.90% 1.20% 2.70% 225.00% 
Municipal Aid 96.60% 4.70% 4.90% 0.40% 1.50% 375.00% 
Parks & Tourism 95.50% 7.30% 7.60% 1.70% 5.10% 300.00% 
State Police 92.60% 6.50% 7.00% 2.60% 3.40% 130.80% 
 
We use the previous year’s budget decisions as the basis for measuring 
budgeting stability (i.e. in(de)crementalism) and use changes in state-level per 
capita personal income as the basis for understanding responsiveness to 
changes in economic condition. Per capita personal income, like state GSP, 
measures the economic well-being of a state (Broda & Tate, 2014) and, thus, 
is appropriate to measure economic condition. Per capita personal income has 
been broadly used in the literature as an indicator of economic performance 
(see for example Bishop et al., 1992; Connaughton & Madsen, 2004; Garnick, 
1990; Hofer & Wörgötter, 1997). The change in personal income is measured 
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as the change in per capita personal income for the previous year. This is be-
cause budget decision making happens before the year commences, and deci-
sion makers are expected to use information available to them during the deci-
sion making period and not during the year for which the budget is being de-
cided. Specifically:  
 
 
Table 3. Allocation Ratios and Department Budget 
Department   
Aging & Adult Services 0.0723 0.37% 
Children & Family Services 0.0290 1.32% 
Corrections 0.0473 5.32% 
County Aid 0.0015 0.61% 
Economic Development 0.0125 0.26% 
Higher Education 0.0196 15.65% 
K-12 Education 0.0257 44.28% 
Labor 0.0129 0.07% 
Municipal Aid 0.0015 0.86% 
Parks & Tourism 0.0216 0.55% 
State Police 0.0282 1.26% 
Note: We focus on the ratio of budget allocations in Level 2 to Level 1 because the amount allocated 
to Level 2 is often small and sometimes zero. The ratio of Level 2 to Level 1 (as opposed to Level 1 
to Level 2) is to avoid having a zero in the denominator. 
 
Personal income data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Since previous research has found that state-level fiscal policy is 
asymmetric, we follow the methodology used by Sorensen and Yosha (2001), 
and create two relative economic change variables representing upturns or 
positive change (%'Personal Income+) and downturns or negative change 
(%'Personal Income–). These relative change variables are measured in com-
parison to the average for the previous four year period, with an upturn corre-
sponding to an above-average change in per capita personal income and a 
downturn defined as a below-average change in per capita personal income. 
More specifically,  
%∆Personal Income+ = Positive percent change in per capita personal income; otherwise 0  
%∆Personal Income– = Negative percent change in per capita personal income; otherwise 0. 
 
% B'ud!get iu Level Z Dept :Budget 
% Budget iu Level 1 state B11dJget 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% Budget in Level 1t 95.452 6.388 68.073 100 
% Budget in Level 2 t 2.098 4.362 0 31.927 
 
0.025 0.059 0 0.469 
Stability     
 
0.025 0.060 0 0.469 
Responsiveness     
%'Personal Incomet,+ 1.009 1.373 0 4.834 
%'Personal Incomet,– -1.147 1.680 -6.146 0 
 
0.018 0.091 0.456 0.638 
Department Size     
 
6.531 13.032 0.010 48.520 
Policy Changes     
Lake View education finance equity litigation     
Year 2005 0.045 0.209 0 1 
Year 2006 0.045 0.209 0 1 
Year 2007 0.045 0.209 0 1 
K12 department AND Year 2005 0.004 0.064 0 1 
K12 department AND Year 2006 0.004 0.064 0 1 
K12 department AND Year 2007 0.004 0.064 0 1 
Annual budget process     
Year 2009 and beyond 0.273 0.446 0 1 
 
To test hypotheses about stability and economic responsiveness, our key 
explanatory variables are previous year budget decisions and positive and neg-
ative changes in economic condition. We include an interaction variable that 
combines previous year’s budget decision with the magnitude of the change in 
economic condition. This interaction variable is intended to capture how forc-
es for stability may be either amplified or attenuated by the need to be respon-
sive to external economic pressures. We also include variables to capture poli-
cy changes that may affect budget decision making. To capture the effects of 
the Lake View educational finance equity court decision, we include dummy 
variables for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Those years represent the re-
[% Budget in Level:Z] x JOO% % Budget in Level 1 t 
[% Budget in Level 2] 
% Budg~t in Level 1 t 1 
[ % Budg~t in Level 2] 
%AP ers 0111a] lrncomet X % Budg~t in Level 1 t - l 
[ Dept. B'mf;get ] x 10 O''.Ki 
T,oul stat e 'Budg~t t 
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sults of regular and special sessions where the Legislature was continually 
reforming education funding to reflect court rulings in the ongoing case as 
well as the court ordered education study (Jordan et al., 2014). In addition, 
because the Lake View case was expected to have a specific impact on K12 
education, we include three dummy variables that capture the combination of 
K12 department and the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. The change 
to annual budgeting (as opposed to biennial budgeting) took effect in 2008, 
impacting budget decisions for the fiscal year 2009 and all years following. 
We include a dummy variable for all years post 2008 to account for this budg-
et process change. Finally, we control for department size by including a 
measure of departmental budget as a percent of the state’s total budget. Given 
ARSA’s prioritization structure, we expect there to be little differences across 
departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allocation ratios. 
With lower priority levels we expect the reverse; differences across depart-
ments will occur. The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
regression analysis are provided in Table 4. 
 
We estimate the following regression models: 
% of Budget in Level it = Di+ Ei,1   
+Ei'Personal Income+,t-1 + Ei'Personal Income–,t-1  
+ Ei'Personal Incomet-1×    
+ E1,5     
+
  
+ Ei,12     
where i=1 or 2 
 
= D3+ E3,1    
                                             +E3,2'Personal Income+,t-1 + E'Personal Income–,t-1  
                                             + E3,4'Personal Incomet-1×    
                                              + E3,5     
                              
+   
     + E3,12     
 
16 
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~% Budget in Level 1 t-l 
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~% Budget in Level 1 t-l 
( Dept. Budget ) x100% 
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( % Budget in Level '2) 
% 'Budget in level l t 
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Annual Budget Pro ,c:ess 
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% :Budget in :Level 1 t-l 
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Given the stability hypothesis that budgeting for higher priority items tend 
to be more stable and incremental, E1,1 and E3,1 are expected to be negative. 
However, E2,1, which captures the incrementalism effects on lower priority 
budget levels is not expected to be statistically significant. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 that lower priority budget items are more responsive to econom-
ic conditions, E2,2 (economic growth) is expected to be positive and E2,3 (eco-
nomic decline) is expected to be negative. Given expected stronger response to 
negative changes in economic conditions, the magnitude of E2,3 is also ex-
pected to be larger than E2,2. Similarly, E3,2 (the ratio of level 2 to level 1) is 
expected to be positive in a growing economy and negative in a declining 
economy, E3,3. In terms of interactions between forces for stability and respon-
siveness, we expect all coefficients (E1,4, E2,4 and E3,4) to be statistically signif-
icant. We do not expect Level 1 prioritization to be dependent on department 
size, so E1,5 is not expected to be statistically significant. However, we expect 
department size to matter for low priority budget items and for E2,5 to be statis-
tically significant. We do not have any expectations for coefficients of the 
Lake View educational finance equity litigation dummy variables (Ei,6 through 
Ei,8). However, given that the case was expected to have specific impact on 
prioritizing K12 education, we expect E1,9, E1,10 and E1,11 (K12 department and 
the reform years) to be positive. Finally, while we control for the switch to an 
annual budget process, we do not have specific expectations regarding statisti-
cal significance or signage for Ei,12.  
 
With panel data of 11 departments across 23 years, we use feasible gener-
alized least squares (FGLS) to estimate models for the three dependent varia-
bles: percent of department budget in priority Level 1, percent of department 
budget in priority Level 2, and ratio of department budget in Level 2 to Level 
1. Our analysis relies on panel data that includes cross-sectional (departments) 
and time-series (fiscal years) information. Several diagnostics and tests were 
conducted to determine the correct model specification and linear regression 
approach, particularly out of concern for heteroscedasticity across departments 
and correlation within and/or between the departments. Statistically significant 
results of the likelihood ratio test (p<.0001) indicated panel-level heterosce-
dasticity. The Woolridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data (p<.0001) 
indicated serial autocorrelation, subsequently the Lagrange-Multiplier test 
(p<.0001) indicated presence of first-order autocorrelation. Statistically signif-
icant results for the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test of cross-sectional 
independence (p<.0001) and Pasaran cross-sectional dependence test 
(p<.0001) indicate the presence of cross-sectional depend-
ence/contemporaneous correlations. FGLS was selected to estimate the model 
since it allowed for (1) first-order serial correlation in the dependent variables 
within each department where the coefficient on the auto-regressive process is 
specific to each department (panel-specific first-order auto-regressive autocor-
relation), (2) heteroscedasticity across panels, and (3) cross-sectional correla-
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tions. FGLS is a more efficient estimation procedure than the pooled OLS, 
fixed effects, and random effects modeling approaches typically used in cross-
sectional, time-series analysis. For our analysis, we utilize FGLS estimation in 
the presence of panel-specific first-order autoregressive autocorrelation within 
panels, contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity 




Our analysis utilizes FGLS estimation in the presence of panel-specific, 
first-order autoregressive autocorrelation within panels, contemporaneous 
cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity across panels. Results of the 
three regression models using FGLS are presented in Table 5.  
 
We hypothesized that budgeting for higher priority items tends to be more 
stable and incremental in nature due to the need to maintain or protect basic 
funding needs. Lower priority items, on the other hand, are considered more 
discretionary and often subject to greater decision making scrutiny. Therefore, 
allocation decisions for lower priority budget levels are expected to be less 
subject to incremental decision making and instead be more open and respon-
sive to economic forces and the perceived likelihood of greater or lesser reve-
nues.  
 
Results for Model 1 show that budgeting for Level 1 is indeed incremental, 
as the coefficient for the stability indicator is statistically significant. The coef-
ficients in Models 1 and 2 capture the average effects (across departments and 
over time) of the explanatory variables on the percentage of the department’s 
budget in the respective priority levels. In Model 1, the greater the previous 
year’s budget allocation of Level 2 relative to Level 1 (i.e. greater allocation 
for lower priority budget items) the lower the current year’s allocation for 
Level 1. For every one percent increase in the ratio of the previous year’s allo-
cation for Level 2 to Level 1, the percentage of the budget allocated for Level 
1 decreases by 11% in the current year. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Surprisingly, results for Model 2 (percent of budget in Level 2) also suggest 
incremental budgeting for lower priority budget items, but the coefficient is 
only marginally significant at p<.10. The coefficient for the stability variable 
was not statistically significant in Model 3.  
 
We can compare the effects of incrementalism across Levels 1 and 2 by 
analyzing the coefficients using average values. If the previous year’s budget 
had 1% more allocated in Level 2 (from 2.10% to 3.10%) and 1% less allocat-
ed in Level 1 (from 95.45% to 94.45%), the corresponding increase in 
 is 0.008 .  
 
[% Budget in Level .2 ] 




" - 0.0243 = o .. oos) 94.4596 
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Table 5. Regression results of panel data linear models using FGLS 







Model 3:  
 
Stability    
 
-10.699* 9.034t 0.088 
Responsiveness    
%'Personal Incomet,+ -0.0596 0.173 0.00187 
%'Personal Incomet,– 0.614** -0.341** -0.00374* 
 
-8.602*** 8.349*** 0.0988*** 
Department Size    
 
-0.0060 0.024* 0.000244t 
Policy Changes    
Lake View education finance equity litigation    
Year 2005 2.667t -1.382t -0.0163 
Year 2006 0.039 2.743*** 0.0365*** 
Year 2007 2.747t 2.284** 0.0290** 
K12 department AND Year 2005 2.160* -.733 -0.00555 
K12 department AND Year 2006 0.772 -0.852 -0.0169 
K12 department AND Year 2007 3.748*** -3.891* -0.0491** 
Annual budget process    
Year 2009 and beyond 2.866*** -1.184 -0.0135* 
Constant 96.379*** 0.884* 0.0104* 
Model Summary    
Estimated Covariances 66 66 66 
Estimated Autocorrelations 11 11 11 
Estimated Coefficients 13 13 13 
No. of Observations 242 
11 
22 
No. of Groups 
Time Periods 
&2 56.73*** 66.01*** 61.72*** 
t p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
[% Budget in Level Z] 
% Budget in Level 1 t 1 
[% Budg~t in Level :i!] %,A.Personal IID£iQ\Diet X % Bu:dg~t in 'Level 1 ~- l 
[ Dept, Budget ] X ] O O''Ki 
T,oital State Budget t 
I I 
% Bo dg.et in LevseJ 2 
%, Bo dg.et in LevseJ !I. 
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The budget allocated in Level 1 for the average department decreases from 
95.45% to 95.36%, which is 0.09% lower (10.699×0.008 = 0.086). The 
budget allocated in Level 2 for the average department increases from 2.10% 
to 2.17% (increase is 9.034×0.008 = 0.072). The percent change in the per-
centages allocated in Levels 1 and 2 were 0.09% and 3.44%, respectively. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, incrementalism has a larger magnitude effect on 
the actual amount of funds budgeted in Level 1 compared to Level 2. Howev-
er, in terms of the relative impact,  Level 2  was affected to a larger  extent, as 
a  change  in previous year’s budget decisions caused a greater percentage 
change on the amount budgeted for Level 2.  
 
In terms of responsiveness, Hypothesis 2 posits that lower priority budget 
levels will be influenced by economic conditions. The responsiveness to nega-
tive economic condition variable (%'Personal Incomet,–) in Model 2 is statis-
tically significant and negative. This indicates that decision makers respond to 
expected economic downturns by decreasing the percent of the department 
budget allocated in the lower priority Level 2. Correspondingly, the same 
measure of responsiveness is statistically significant and positive in Model 1. 
The results of Model 3 reflect the same pattern of results, with the coefficient 
being statistically significant and negative.  
  
Overall, these results show that the extent of receptiveness is dependent on 
whether the economic condition is perceived to be favorable or unfavorable. 
When the economic condition is perceived to be favorable (%'Personal In-
comet,+), there is no statistically significant effect on budget decisions. Howev-
er, the percent of the budget in Level 1 increases and Level 2 decreases if the 
economic condition is perceived as unfavorable (%'Personal Incomet,–). A 1% 
decline in per capita personal income produces a 0.61% increase in the per-
centage of the budget allocated in Level 1 and a 0.34% decline in the budget 
allocated in Level 2. However, given the mean percentage of the budget in 
Level 1 of 95.45% and Level 2 of 2.10% across all the departments, the rela-
tive impact is higher on the Level 2 budget with a 16.19% 
 decline in the budget allocated in Level 2. In contrast, the 
0.62% increase in the Level 1 budget represents a 0.64%  
growth in the budget. As hypothesized, then, the lower priority budget level 
(Level 2) is affected to a greater degree by perceptions of economic condi-
tions, in support of rational decision-making. 
 
In terms of the interactions between stability and responsiveness, results 
show that the Level 1 budget is affected to a greater degree than the Level 2 
budget (the magnitude of the coefficient for Level 1 was 8.602, compared to 
8.349 for Level 2), but the differences between the two are not statistically 
( 0..34i% = 16,.19%) 2.10% 
( 0 .621% = 0.64i%) 95,.4596 
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significantly different than zero. We can conclude, then, that both Level 1 and 
Level 2 budgets are simultaneously influenced by both measures of stability 
and responsiveness, and that the size of the influence is equal across the two 
levels but in opposite directions. 
     
Given ARSA’s prioritization structure, we also expect there to be little dif-
ferences across departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allo-
cation ratios, and the reverse for lower priority departments. We see this in the 
results of our regression analysis, where department size (relative to the state 
budget) is statistically significant in Model 2 but not in Model 1. The coeffi-
cient for department size is marginally significant at p<.10 in Model 3. 
 
It is also important to note that budget decisions are affected by policy 
change. Specifically, decision makers appear to respond to changes in the de-
cision making process (i.e. a shift to annual budgeting) and to changes in pri-
orities (the Lake View education finance equity court decision that made K12 
education a funding priority). The dummy variable for the annual budget pro-
cess period (Year 2009 and beyond) was statistically significant in Model 1 
(positive signage) and Model 3 (negative signage). These results suggest that 
as the state moved to an annual budget, the decision makers increased the 
amount of the budget they prioritized as Level 1. With an annual budget pro-
cess, each year’s budget undergoes a thorough review process. There is more 
frequent scrutiny of resource allocation decisions compared to a biennial 
budget process where off-year budgets face less review. Decision makers and 
department advocates may feel the need to protect the budgets – which come 
under more scrutiny post-2009 – by placing more of the budget in Level 1. 
This added scrutiny may be due to the shift to annual budgeting, but could also 
be due to the tightening of state budgets due to the recent recession. 
 
The Lake View education finance equity court decision also had an effect 
on all departments, as the decision makers attempt to protect the budgets by 
increasing the percentages of the budget they place in Level 1. A much more 
pronounced increase was seen for K12 departmental budgets, with the strong-
est effect being seen in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal years 2005 and 2007, this 
department increased its reliance on Level 1 spending by 4.83% 
(2.16+2.67=4.83) and 6.50% (2.75+3.75=6.50), respectively.  
 
Interestingly, the dummy variables for years 2006 and 2007 were statisti-
cally significant and positive in Models 2 and 3. These results could reflect the 
impacts of the Lake View education finance equity litigation, but may also 
reflect the boom in government revenues. The assurances of surplus revenues 
may have prompted decision makers to be more assured that funds would be 
distributed for lower level budget item. Such confidence may have made them 
more likely to increase the percentage of the budget categorized as lower pri-
ority (Level 2).   





Jordan’s (2006) previous finding that the highest priority items are stable 
and lower priority items are volatile is confirmed; however, there has been a 
growth in the proportion of the budget prioritized in Level 1of the departments 
examined. This increase in Level 1 may be the result of protectionism during 
the Great Recession of the departments examined here. Interestingly, the 
Grand Total of the state budget in Level 1 is about 91%, indicating that a de-
cline in the proportion of the department budgets in Level 1 for departments 
not included in this study compensated much of the increase in Level 1 for the 
departments in our study. Overall, the results indicate that the ARSA approach 
to budgeting favors stability, regardless of priority level. However, ARSA also 
allows for responsiveness to economic conditions, but with a larger effect for 
the lower priority budget items. Furthermore, the extent of this responsiveness 
varies depending on whether economic conditions are expected to be favorable 
or unfavorable. Finally, department size also plays a role in decisions regard-
ing discretionary (lower priority) budget items, with larger departments having 
greater reliance on lower priority budget levels.  
 
Incrementalism continues to be a strong influence on budget changes in 
our first two models, even in the presence of rational decision making. This is 
similar to Reddick’s (2003) findings that incremental decision making occurs 
in conjunction with rational decision making. The previous year’s budget is 
still of primary importance to decision makers, especially as they determine 
the proportion of the budget to place in the top two priority levels. 
 
Our findings suggest that the rational consideration of a decline in the 
economy impacts prioritization, while the expectation of an economic upturn 
does not influence prioritization. This suggests that when the economy is 
good, there is no need to reprioritize, and the status quo is maintained. On the 
other hand, a declining economy is associated with an increase in the percent 
of the budget in the top priority level and a decline in Level 2. Details of the 
decline in Level 2 cannot be determined from the data. However, the decline is 
statistically significant and could reflect a shift in the location of budget items 
or a decline in the budgeted amount. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
during a declining economy, the top priority is protected, which is the goal of 
ARSA.  
 
The interaction of economic responsiveness and budget stability is signifi-
cant at the 0.001 level across all models, and the magnitude on prioritizing 
Level 1 and Level 2 are quite strong. Simultaneously, the incremental influ-
ence of the previous year’s budget and the rational influence of economic con-
ditions are related to prioritization. Given the separate and combined magni-
tudes of the budget stability and economic responsiveness, our findings sug-
gest that incrementalism is still a powerful influence. 
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ARSA is yet another way that rationality and incrementalism coexist in 
budgeting. Decision makers (the Governor and the Legislature) must catego-
rize the budgets into priority levels. Categorization is influenced largely by 
what existed in the prior year; however, change in economic condition also 
influences that prioritization, especially an economic decline. The top priority 
level is more protected during an economic downturn, creating more stability 
for the highest priority. This suggests that ARSA is achieving its purpose of 
stabilization during negative revenue fluctuations. 
 
The key limitation of this study is that the ARSA legislation and process 
are unique to one state. However, the transferable value of the findings is that 
prioritization could be an effective form of contingency planning that is an 
alternative or supplement to a state rainy day fund. Prioritization may help 
states to preserve their rainy day funds for periods of extreme or prolonged 
revenue stagnation or decline like the states experienced with the Great Reces-
sion. The fact that the Grand Total of Arkansas’ budget in the top priority lev-
el is approximately 92%, while the departments studied here ranged from 92% 
to 98% in Level 1, indicates some lowering of priorities in other departments 
not studied. While the resulting 8% cushion in the total budget is still greater 
than most states’ rainy day funds, the caution to states that choose to imple-
ment budgeting by priorities is that the effectiveness of the method can only 




Bartle, J. R. (1996) “Coping with cutbacks: City responses to aid cuts in New 
York State”, State and Local Government Review, 28(1):38-48. 
 
Behn, R. D. (1985) “Cutback budgeting”, Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 4(2):155-177. 
 
Bishop, J. A., Formby, J. P., & Thistle, P. D. (1992) “Explaining interstate 
variation in income inequality”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
74(3):553-557. 
 
Broda, J. E., & Tate, R. P. (2014) Comprehensive Revision of Gross Domestic 
Product by State: Advance Statistics for 2013 and Revised Statistics for 1997–
2012. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. Accessed 
October 9, 2014 
(www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2014/07%20July/0714_gdp_by_%20state.pdf ). 
 
Conant, J. K. (2010) “Introduction: The “Great Recession,” state budgets, and 
state budget deficits”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1):1-14. 
 
 Budgeting by priorities 
 
90 
Connaughton, J. E., & Madsen, R. A. (2004) “Explaining per capita personal 
income differences between states”, The Review of Regional Studies, 34(2): 
206-220.  
 
Dautrich, K., Robbins, M. D. & Simonsen, B. (2010) “Budget deficits in the 
states: Connecticut”, Public Budgeting and Finance, 30(1):103-151. 
 
Dougherty, M. J., & Klase, K. A. (2009) “Fiscal retrenchment in state budget-
ing: Revisiting cutback management in a new era”, International Journal of 
Public Administration, 32(7):593-619. 
 
Draper, F. D. & Pitsvada, B. T. (1981) “ZBB-Looking Back After Ten Years”, 
Public Administration Review, 41(1):76-83. 
 
Garnick, D. H. (1990) “Accounting for regional differences in per capita per-
sonal income growth: an update and extension”, Survey of Current Business, 
70(1):29-40. 
 
Hofer, H., & Wörgötter, A. (1997) “Regional per capita income convergence 
in Austria”, Regional Studies, 31(1):1-12. 
 
Hou, Y. (2004) “Budget stabilization fund: Structural features of the enabling 
legislation and balance levels”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 24(3):38-64. 
 
Hou, Y., Lunsford, R. S., Sides, K.C., & Jones, K. A. (2011) “State perfor-
mance-based budgeting in boom and bust years: An analytical framework and 
survey of the states”, Public Administration Review, 71(3):370-388. 
 
Hou,Y. (2006) “Budgeting for fiscal stability over the business cycle: A coun-
tercyclical fiscal policy and the multiyear perspective on budgeting”, Public 
Administration Review, 66(5):730-741. 
 
Jordan, M. M. (2006) “Arkansas Revenue Stabilization Act: Stabilizing pro-
grammatic impact through prioritized revenue distribution”, State and Local 
Government Review, 38(2):104-111. 
 
Jordan, M. M., & Hackbart, M. M. (1999) “Performance budgeting and per-
formance funding in the states: A status assessment”, Public Budgeting and 
Finance, 19(1):68-88. 
 
Jordan, M. M., Chapman, D., & Wrobel, S. L. (2014) “Rich districts, poor 
districts: The property tax equity impact of Arkansas school finance equaliza-
tion”, Public Finance and Management, 14(4):399-415. 
 
Jordan, Yusuf & Hooshmand 
 
91 
Joyce, P. G. (2001) “What’s so magical about five percent? A nationwide look 
at factors that influence the optimal size of state rainy day funds”, Public 
Budgeting & Finance, 21(2):62-87.  
 
Klase, K. A. (2011) “The intersection of flexible budgeting and cutback man-
agement: factors affecting responses of selected states to recent economic re-
cessions”, Public Finance and Management, 11(2):197-230. 
 
Levine, C. H. (1978) “Organizational decline and cutback management”, Pub-
lic Administration Review, 38(4):316–25. 
 
Lauth, T. P. (2014) “Zero-base budgeting redux in Georgia: Efficiency or ide-
ology?”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 34(1):1–17.  
 
Reddick, C. G. (2003) “Testing rival theories of budgetary decision-making in 
the US States”, Financial Accountability and Management, 19(4):315-339. 
 
Robinson, S. E., Caver, F. S., Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2007) “Explain-
ing policy punctuations: Bureaucratization and budget change”, American 
Journal of Political Science, 51(1):140–50.  
 
Ryu, J. E., Bowling, C. J., Cho, C. L., & Wright, D. S. (2008) “Exploring ex-
planations of state agency budgets: Institutional budget actors or exogenous 
environment?”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 28(3):23-47. 
 
Schick, A. (1983) “Incremental budgeting in a decremental age”, Policy Sci-
ences, 16(1):1-25. 
 
Snell, R. (2011) State experiences with annual and biennial budgeting. Na-
tional Conference of State  Legislatures. Accessed September 20, 2014. 
(http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/BiennialBudgeting_May2011.pdf). 
 
Sorensen, B. E., & Yosha, O. (2001) “Is state fiscal policy asymmetric over 
the business cycle?”, Economic Review – Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, 86(3):43-64.  
 
Wallin, B. A. & Snow, D. (2010) “Budget deficits in the states: Massachu-
setts”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1):80-104. 
 
Wildavsky, A. B. (1964) The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Boston: Little 
Brown. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
